From the PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION of 1915.We republish this little book because it has been found by experience to meet a widely-felt need, and to meet it in a compendious form. The dangers against which we uttered so strong a warning have unfortunately been realized: Bulgaria has joined our enemies. As a result, some paragraphs will be found to be out of date. But we have thought it best to leave the whole book unchanged, except that the chapter which deals with the diplomatic methods of the moment is now relegated to an appendix. Nothing has happened to disprove our contention that these methods would have succeeded at the time when they were proposed, and though in the Near East it is the unexpected that happens, the time may come when they will be once more in place... The book in its original form was, and is, a connected whole. It sets forth certain principles and a certain ideal, which have by no means lost their importance. The immediate prospect is obscure, but, to those who look to the ultimate settlement, the complications of the moment represent a movement of the surface rather than of the depths beneath. There are factors in Balkan policy which are fundamental because they are rooted in conditions which do not alter. It was upon these factors that the policy set forth in this book was founded. The first arises from the geographical position of the Balkans, which has made them the battleground for the rivalry of the great neighboring empires -- a rivalry which found material to work upon in the mutual hatred caused by unjust frontiers. It follows from this that so long as such rivalry continues, it is to the real and permanent advantage of every Balkan State, without exception, to look for support to the disinterested Powers of the West. The second factor arises from the distribution of Balkan nationalities. "Room must be found and kept," to use Mr. Asquith's words, " for the independent existence and free development of the small nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own." Any rearrangement which fails to take this consideration into account will leave behind it the seeds of future war. Others will doubtless be urged at the time of settlement -- Economic and strategic needs, the idea of a Balkan equilibrium or balance of power, and the desirability of rewarding or punishing particular States. But it cannot be too often insisted that peace will not be secured unless, broadly speaking, the lines of nationality are accepted as the basis for the new frontiers. The degree in which this ideal may be attainable is, of course, a matter of uncertainty. But real statesmanship will bear it in mind, and approach as near to it as circumstances allow.