CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
The place of minds in reality is a problem that philosophers across traditions and time have
thought about. Within western philosophy, since Descartes, this has taken the shape of the
mind-body problem. In contemporary west ern analytic philosophy, one particular aspect of this
age-old problem has evoked considerable attention and has come to be known as the hard
problem of consciousness or the hard part of the mind- body problem1 - the metaphysical
question of how there can be conscious, mental phenomena in a physical world .
Metaphysics is the philosophical study of what-there-is and what-it-is.2 The metaphysical
question about the mind is then the question of whether our ontology ought to include the
mind (and mental properties), or whether an ontology of physical entities would suffice.
Further, one also needs to explicate what one mean s by the mind and physical entities
before one can answer questions of what there is. Broadly, there are two major responses to this
question. On the one hand is physicalism, the view that all concrete phenomena including minds and
mental phenomena are physical or grounded in physical phenomena. On the other is dualism, the view
that minds and mental phenomena are a second kind distinct from the physical. While the orthodoxy
in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism, versions of dualism have
remained influential, if only as the opponents that physicalists argue against.
