This book follows the course of the post-Singapore campaign from its beginnings to the bitter end, woven around the story of 49th Bty, 48th LAA Regiment and other Royal Artillery units, to show how politics and military commands affected both ends of the scale, top to bottom, from the General to the Gunner, from the Brigadier to the Bombadier. What happened is often told in their own words and almost always taken from contemporary accounts. It is the true story of the fiasco in the Far East following the Allies' first attempt to set up a joint command to stop the all-conquering Japanese, as first Hong Kong, then Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines fell before them. It was impossible to resource properly from the start and ABDACOM's collapse left thousands of British and Australian personnel on the island of Java with orders to fight to the last man and the last bullet. The magic carpet out was only available for a select few. The senior officers who had staffed ABDACOM generally departed, and officers and men with particular skills or abilities that the Allies desperately needed were shipped away as the Japanese net closed around Java. Generally those left behind were those who were 'expendable'. They were left under the command of the colonial Dutch commanders, men who had never expected nor been trained to deal with such a situation. Their defence plan for the island had two parts. Firstly to try to use what ships and aircraft they had to stop the Japanese landing on Java in the first place. The second (post-invasion) plan was based on the assumption that there were only two beaches where the Japanese might land. Given this, the Allied forces would undertake a fighting retreat to delay the invaders, so that any relief force that might be around would have time to turn up. Failing this, the 'last stand' would be around the city of Bandoeng in the mountainous central spine of the island. As plans go it was not particularly ambitious but, given the circumstances and the forces at their disposal, it was the best they could do. The major flaw in this was that it relied on the Japanese landing on one or both of two beaches. Unfortunately, they also landed on a third, only forty miles away by good roads from Kalidjati, one of the two major airbases on the island. It should have been obvious that such a facility so close to the coast would be a prime target for the enemy. There was plenty of room there for their fighter and bomber aircraft and they could destroy the puny defence forces on Java within days. And the airfield was also only a few miles from a road leading to Bandoeng; a shorter route to the one the Dutch commanders hoped the invaders would take. If the Japanese took Kalidjati, the whole defence plan would be in ruins. The loss of Kalidjati is the centrepiece and climax of this book. Kalidjati was where it all went wrong and with Kalidjati lost, Java was doomed. What happened there on 1st March 1942 was a 'perfect storm' when everything that could go wrong, did go wrong. It was a microcosm of the chaotic campaign that followed the fall of Singapore: a hostile climate, no knowledge of the local language, no orders or intelligence from above, lack of essential equipment, stores and ammunition, and incompetence, indecisiveness and inadequate communications at all levels. Many men paid a terrible price for their superiors' failings in the flash-flood that swept through the airfield that day.