THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply state action doctrine. * * To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation at issue occurred because of action taken by the defendant "under color of . . . state law." Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). "The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). Section 1983's "color-of-law prerequisite is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement" applicable to Fourteenth Amendment claims, "and the analysis for each is identical." Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d at 180. Both inquiries demand that "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State." Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). "[T]here is no specific formula for determining whether state action is present." Id. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, "[w]hat is fairly attributable [to the state]"-i.e., what constitutes action under color of state law-"is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts must examine the "totality of the circumstances," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), to determine if the action at issue "bore a 'sufficiently close nexus' with the State to be 'fairly treated as that of the State itself, '" Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 525 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)).Although no one factor is determinative, this Court has held that a defendant's purportedly private actions bear a "sufficiently close nexus" with the State to satisfy Section 1983's color-of-law requirement when the defendant's challenged "actions are linked to events which arose out of his official status." Id. at 524. When a defendant's "status" as a public official "enabled [her] to execute [a challenged action] in a manner that private citizens never could have," then the action also is more likely to be treated as attributable to the state. Id. at 526; see also Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[S]ection 1983 is . . . implicated. . . [when] the conduct is such that the actor could not have behaved in that way but for the authority of his office."); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that challenged conduct is more likely to amount to state action when "the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Likewise, an official's conduct is more likely to amount to state action when it "occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office." Martinez, 54 F.3d at 986. And the challenged action of a defendant governmental official is likely to be treated as taken under color of law when the official "use[d] the power and prestige of his state office to damage the plaintiff." Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 337 (7th Cir. 1979). In the context of an alleged First Amendment violation, in particular, this Court has found that a challenged action by a governmental official is fairly attributable to the state when "the sole intention" of the official in taking the action was "to suppress speech critical of his conduct of official duties or fitness for public office." Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 524. Davison v. Randall, 912 F. 3d 666 (4th Cir. 201