The financing of hazard mitigation continues to, be one of the more difficult impediments to creating a seismically safe environment for Californians. Both State and local governments have undertaken mitigation utilizing a variety of funding mechanisms. California is one of the most seismically active States in the U.S. The statistics generated by seismologists are sobering. Over the coming decades variously sized earthquakes can be expected throughout the State, some with catastrophic damage potential. A sample statistic: there is a 90% probability that either the San Francisco Bay Area or the Los Angeles basin will suffer a magnitude 7 or larger earthquake by the year 2020. Each of the many large earthquakes predicted throughout the State can cause billions of dollars in property damage, loss of human life, injury, and disruptions in transportation, communications and utilities. As one response to this threat, because unreinforced masonry buildings (URMs) are susceptible to serious damage in a major earthquake, in 1986 the State of California adopted what is commonly referred to as "the URM Law." As discussed later in this Handbook, this law requires municipalities and counties within the most seismically active zones in the State to identify and create hazard mitigation programs for the unreinforced masonry buildings in their jurisdiction. A number of earthquake experts are now recommending that such identification and mitigation be applied to other seismically hazardous structures as well, including concrete frame structures lacking ductile connections, poorly designed tilt-up concrete buildings with inadequate roof-wall connections, and older (pre-1960) homes with inadequate strength in their foundations or cripple walls. The URM Law stopped short of requiring the owners of URM buildings to upgrade their structures. Many communities, however, have taken the initiative and mandated retrofitting of privately-owned URMs and other hazardous buildings. A few jurisdictions have mitigated the URM hazard in their community and more are in the process of doing so. The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, having identified some or all of the hazards, are wondering what they might do to mitigate them. This Handbook has been designed with that group in mind. The Handbook was conceived as part of an effort to find sources of financing for retrofit of privately owned hazardous buildings. The first step in the research process was to survey the 520 cities, towns and counties in California as to the status of their URM retrofit programs, and to gather information on any financial and non-financial incentive programs they may have established. Although more than 35% of those surveyed did respond, very few respondents had implemented any retrofit incentive programs. While the survey did not reveal the pot of gold, we were excited and encouraged by the creativity and resourcefulness of the few jurisdictions which have found ways to leverage or develop financing while promoting retrofitting in their communities. Their efforts are described in this Handbook. The heart of the Handbooklies in the CASE STUDIES, which describe steps to promote retrofitting taken by jurisdictions throughout California that may serve as models for others. The case studies were selected from responses to our survey. We met with staff at these municipalities to develop the case studies, which include descriptions of these jurisdictions' programs, as well as discussions of their programs' development, the resources they require, and their effectiveness.