Have traditional ulama conflated if not replaced ethics with rituals? Why are there no books in Bukhari on justice, reason, freedom, or ethics? Even Shatibi refrained from treating justice as a purpose of Islamic law. The de-emphasis on ethics, in tandem with the enforcement of religiosity is reducing the attractiveness of Islam. Muslims turn to Islamism because they are unable to find justice in tradition, which is becoming less relevant as a result of disregarding key teachings of the Book of Allah. The failure to treat non-Muslims with justice is palpable in the teaching of jihad al-talab, a radical rendition of religion without grounding in revelation. The pushback for unjust efforts to propagate Islam by the sword, based in addition on traditions according to which "the blood of the kafir is halal for the believer," resulted in defeats for the umma, bringing an end to every empire without exception. For building an empire upon a corrupt knowledge of revelation is to build on quicksand. The repression of reason exacerbated the misunderstanding of revelation and the treatment of tradition as "revelation." The repression of reason stifled freedom of expression, thereby inhibiting progress. Traditional exegesis and jurisprudence rest on problematic premises. These encompass the perceptions that revelation is flawed because it is "unclear," "incomplete," and "incoherent." These presupposition emerged because of the reticence to use reason. They corrupted exegesis. Accordingly, traditional exegesis and jurisprudence require reconstruction, on the basis of presuppositions that are in accord with, rather than in defiance of the teaching of revelation. Further tenets in defiance of revelation encompass the perception that tradition is revelation, that reason is subordinate to tradition, the assumption that isnad matters more than matn, the teaching of predestination, the teaching of abrogation, the teaching of jihad al-talab, and the perception that the globe is a battlefield between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. The premises that tradition is revelation, that it judges, abrogates and even replaces revelation are particularly troubling. For they are expressions of scriptural and juristic shirk. The tainting of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence render them ill-equipped to generate reliable scriptural and juristic analysis. Traditional exegesis and jurisprudence rest on premises. A premise is an assertion that provides a pillar of the analysis. Premises take the form of presuppositions. Presuppositions could be in accord with, indifferent to, or in defiance of a discourse a particular exegesis endeavours to articulate. As a matter of principle, all presuppositions in the exegesis of revelation should be derived from revelation. If for any reason a particular presupposition veers from or defies revelation, the analysis based upon that presupposition becomes flawed and requires being rehabilitated or rejected. This transpired with a few presuppositions in traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. They encompass the perceptions that revelation is flawed because it is "unclear," "incomplete," and "incoherent." These perceptions require being replaced with assumptions that are in accord with the teaching of revelation. There is a possibility of neglecting substance by excessive preoccupation with formalities. There is much emphasis on the recitation of revelation. Regrettably, much recitation takes place without comprehension. It has been said that actions speak louder than words. We must walk the talk. The focus on formalities is reflected in the emphasis on the performance of rituals at the expense of ethics. But the Book of Allah emphasizes ethics. This is evident in verses nineteen to thirty-five in chapter seventy of the Book of Allah. These verses describe in detail the actions of persons that perform the salat. Allah warns us about persons who pray, but refuse even neighbourly deeds.