The concept of rationality has often been discussed within the restrictive
bounds of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, reason and tradition.
In this thesis, I have sought to question this sharp distinction between reason
and tradition. On the strength of my study in the work, I am led to think that the
questions of theoretical rationality as in mathematics and the sciences, as well as
of practical rationality as in the value disciplines or in choosing one from
amongst different competing theories and traditions, cannot be asked nor
answered in isolation from their relevant traditions of inquiry (the epistemic
enterprise), that rationality essentially is tradition embedded. Given the plurality
of diverse traditions, problems of relativism and incommensurability arise. I
endeavour to address these problems in the light of the brute fact of actual
contact, interaction, understanding and communication between different
traditions. I show that the incommensurability thesis does not necessarily lead to
relativism and that the view of tradition embedded rationality which is
maintained in this work need not be characterized as relativistic. In the course
of my argument, I have considered different ways of examining the issue of
conflict resolution between rival traditions in terms of growth and development
of inquiry with a view to transcending the narrow limitations of particular
viewpoints.
