At this critical stage of the battle, Pope's brigade, which had already halted and was waiting for orders, now became leaderless. An event then occurred which most British historians, from 1849 onwards have found hard to explain or account for. HM 14th Light Dragoons turned about and bolted! The native cavalry also panicked and followed HM 14th Light Dragoon rearwards, galloping through, at top speed, through their own horse artillery batteries positioned behind them! Fortescue states that HM 14th Light Dragoon bolted because Pope gave them a word of command of "Threes Right" which they heard as something like "Threes about" and that's why the brigade bolted! There is no doubt that had a native cavalry unit, alone, done so Fortescue's verdict would have been much harsher! Jawahir Singh Nalwa pursued Pope's cavalry brigade with great élan, cutting down many Bengal horse artillerymen, including Major Christie, one of the battery commanders, destroying (spiking) six guns and carrying off four guns intact, apart from two ammunition wagons and fifty three horses as war trophies! Pope's cavalry brigade from this moment on ceased to be a fighting formation! It was rallied with great difficulty by Gough's staff and the regimental Chaplain of HM 14th LD, with his pistol! It was said that Gough recommended the Chaplain to be promoted to the rank of Brevet Bishop, on the battlefield! The flight of Pope's brigade resulted in a serious operational imbalance in the British position. Their right rear flank was now vulnerable to counter attack. Sher Singh Attariwalla immediately ordered a counterattack and Sikh infantry and cavalry west of Rasul immediately advanced down from the heights through the open gap, encircling Gilbert's division from the rear! It was Pope's good luck that he died soon afterwards from wounds suffered in the battle.
About the Author: Agha H. Amin, Retired Tank corps major who served in five tank regiments and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in various staff, instructional and research assignments. In his Pakistan Army tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support group, and RFS Concept. His writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals, Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta. His recommendations regarding bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff cadre advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition his recommendation of grouping various corps into army commands advanced in an article published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote The Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998, Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999, Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010), Taliban War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence Journal, Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies . An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and Alexandrian Defense group. Carried out various oil and gas and power transmission line surveys in West Asia. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and monthly Military and Security Review. Heads the think tank Centre for study of Intelligence Operations established in early 2010.