This dissertation is comprised of three papers which consider prominent issues in
bioethics. The three topics can be briefly stated as: 1) a refutation of the responsibility
objection to abortion, 2) a rejection of the orthodox bioethical arguments attempting to justify
removal of artificial nutrition and hydration from persistent vegetative state patients, and 3) a
demand to revise the current orthodox criteria for determining death.
The Responsibility Objection to Abortion is a common and prominent objection to
abortion in general. The objection claims that a woman is responsible for the fetus growing
inside her body as a result of her willing participation in sexual activity. I argue that the
Responsibility Objection to Abortion fails to establish that a woman must provide care to her
unborn fetus. I do so by examining the various iterations in which the responsibility objection
has been presented and then identifying the particular conception of responsibility that each
iteration of the objection must be utilizing in order to ground the particular version of the
objection. My contention is that once examined in this manner I am able to demonstrate that
each iteration of the objection is unable to establish an obligation to provide care on the part of
a pregnant woman to her unborn fetus. Thus, the responsibility objection ceases to be a serious
objection to a woman's reproductive freedom.
