Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed nonstate groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After an armed uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for postconflict justice and reconciliation. Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly were held and transparently administered in 2012 and 2014, but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition. Insecurity remained prevalent in Libya following the 2011 conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Resulting conflicts involving Libyans in different parts of the country drove the political transition off course. At present, armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. Criminals and violent Islamist extremists have exploited these conditions, and the latter remain active inside Libya and threaten Libya's neighbors. The 2017 U.S. AFRICOM Posture Statement states that "the instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant, near-term threat to U.S. and allies' interests" in Africa. U.S. officials and other international actors have worked since August 2014 to convince Libyan factions and their regional supporters that inclusive, representative government and negotiation are preferable to competing attempts to achieve dominance through force of arms. In August 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council adopted Resolution 2174, authorizing the placement of financial and travel sanctions on individuals and entities found to be "engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition." In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-brokered political agreement to create a Government of National Accord (GNA) to oversee the completion of the transition. GNA Prime Minister-designate Fayez al Sarraj and members of a GNA Presidency Council have attempted to implement the agreement with the backing of the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. government, and the European Union. Political leaders and military forces based in eastern Libya, including General Khalifa Haftar's "Libyan National Army" movement, have struggled with the GNA over governance, military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. The U.S. State Department describes Libya as a permissive environment for terrorists and suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in July 2014. U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya via the Libya External Office at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. From August to December 2016, U.S. military forces supported a successful campaign by GNA-aligned forces to expel Islamic State supporters from the central coastal city of Sirte. Shared concerns persist regarding remaining extremists, the weakness of state institutions, and flows of migrants, refugees, and contraband across Libya's unpoliced borders. In parallel with more robust counterterrorism measures since 2016, the Obama and Trump Administrations have notified Congress of plans to use U.S. funding to support Libyans and the GNA. The Trump Administration has not named a new U.S. envoy for Libya. Libya is among the countries identified in a 2017 Executive Order that would restrict the entry of nationals of certain countries to the United States, with some exceptions. Political consensus among Libyans remains elusive, and insecurity may continue to preclude the return to Libya of U.S. diplomats and the development of U.S.-Libyan relations.