This paper addresses the question, can and should the Air Force pursue an unmanned multirole fighter to replace manned systems? Unmanned aircraft systems have demonstrated enormous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in both flexibility and persistence. Current and emerging technology may permit unmanned fighters to replace conventional multirole aircraft in the face of high endurance missions, evolving threat systems, and political pressure to preserve human life. This research is framed in the context of a specialized weapon in military aviation: an unmanned multirole fighter capable of replacing manned systems and their respective missions. This paper gives a brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles and their employment as weapons to demonstrate the evolution from ISR platform to unmanned combat air vehicle and then evolves into two main sections of "can we" and "should we" pursue this avenue of development. The primary means of answering the research question is both technical and philosophical. Before being able to answer if the Air Force should pursue an unmanned fighter, it is necessary to determine if it is technically feasible for such a system. A methodical analysis of mission subsets and common tasks that fighters currently perform and how those tasks might be performed in an unmanned vehicle are examined to substantiate technical capability. Inherent to this discussion are the obvious questions of remote piloting versus autonomous operations, command and control, and weaknesses that may be presented to an adversary. Modern media, political costs of human life, single points of failure, command and control, and monetary costs are then addressed to develop the subjective main point of pursuing acquisition. The range and endurance of unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) fighters offer persistence and attractive options in a world of growing antiaccess strategies. They offer advantages in performance, altitude, and employment without the limitations of human physiology. UCAV fighters vi deny the political use of prisoners of war by our adversaries and preserve the tactical knowledge of our pilots at home. The research finds there are no technological barriers that prohibit the design and use of UCAV fighters on a large scale. There are anticipated limitations in bandwidth and concern for performance during within-visual-range maneuvering if man-in-the-loop is the solution to command and control. Ultimately, UCAV fighters are not a panacea but offer the presence of force in a threat environment that 20 years from now will be extremely lethal. The costs and risks associated with UCAV fighters are significant but surmountable. The single point of failure may be in our command and control through the radio frequency spectrum. Autonomy provides a solution but is incompatible with US ascription to the law of armed conflict and its mandates. If sufficient bandwidth can be secured and the control of remote vehicles can be assured, there are immense dollar and political costs to be saved in their employment. In the context of future threat systems and antiaccess strategies, the Air Force would be foolish not to pursue UCAV fighter technology.