The multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) provides Iran broad relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's civilian economic sectors. On January 16, 2016, upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments, U.S. Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws took effect, relevant Executive Orders (E.O.s) were revoked, and corresponding U.N. and EU sanctions were lifted ("Implementation Day"). Remaining in place have been those secondary sanctions (sanctions on foreign firms) that have been imposed because of Iran's support for terrorism, its human rights abuses, its interference in specified countries in the region, and its missile and advanced conventional weapons programs, as well as sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and designated commanders, subunits, and affiliates. Some additional sanctions on these entities and activities were made mandatory by the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44). A general ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran, including regulations barring transactions between U.S. and Iranian banks, remains in place. Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, most U.N. sanctions terminated as of Implementation Day, but some U.N. restrictions on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and its importation or exportation of arms remain in place for several years. Iran was able to develop its nuclear and missile programs and to assist pro-Iranian regional groups and governments even when strict sanctions were in place. Still, the relief from sanctions on Iran's most vital sectors has returned Iran's economy to growth and enabled Iran to potentially further expand its weapons programs and increase its regional influence. As part of a shift to assertively counter Iran's regional activities and strategic weapons programs, the Trump Administration has designated for sanctions additional missile and IRGC-related entities. The Administration asserts its steps do not conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA and the Administration has continued to implement the agreement, including renewing waivers of sanctions laws suspended in accordance with the JCPOA. Were the Administration to decide to end U.S. participation in the JCPOA, it could revoke waivers, decline to renew waivers, or sign new sanctions legislation or issue Executive Orders that breach the JCPOA. Some Iran sanctions legislation has advanced in the 115th Congress, such as S. 722, which was amended in the Senate to include sanctions on Russia and is expected to be further amended to also include sanctions on North Korea. The reimposition of U.S. secondary sanctions would undoubtedly harm Iran's economy. Iran's economy shrank by 9% in the two years that ended in March 2014, before stabilizing since 2015 as a result of modest sanctions relief under an interim nuclear agreement. Sanctions caused Iran's crude oil exports to fall from about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2011 to about 1.1 mbd by mid-2013, and made inaccessible more than $120 billion in Iranian reserves held in banks abroad. Sanctions relief has enabled Iran's oil exports to return to nearly presanctions levels, allowed Iran to regain access to funds held abroad and reintegrate into the international financial system, and helped Iran achieve about 7% overall economic growth in 2016. Foreign energy firms have begun making new investments in Iran's energy sector and major aircraft manufacturers have sold Iran's commercial airlines new passenger aircraft. Nuclear negotiations and sanctions relief helped Iran's President Hassan Rouhani politically, contributing to his victory over a strong hardliner rival in the May 19, 2017, presidential election.