Since India declared itself a nuclear weapon state in May 1998, its nuclear capabilities have grown significantly. India is now on the verge of acquiring a triad of nuclear delivery systems. Its increasing nuclear profile has also stirred a debate on its stated nuclear doctrine involving principles of No First Use (NFU) and massive retaliation. This Letort Paper examines changes in India's nuclear trajectory, the accompanying doctrinal debate, and its nonproliferation policies in the backdrop of the current regional and international context. The implications of this for the United States and its policy in the Asia-Pacific region are also discussed.
India's nuclear arsenal development is generating new technical options for its nuclear strategy. India is developing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-range Agni-V and Agni-VI ballistic missiles, and is claiming that these will be able to host multiple nuclear warheads. It is also building a new generation of short-range and potentially nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and fielding an indigenous naval nuclear force. However, as these advancements interact with those of India's strategic rivals, China and Pakistan, they threaten to blur nuclear thresholds and elevate the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation due to misperception.
Despite these shifts, India's official public nuclear doctrine has not been updated since 2003, and as such, does not assess the potential implications of its emerging technical options, nor the changing strategic environment for India's nuclear policy. While there is growing debate within India on the wisdom of continued adherence to the two main tenets of the Indian nuclear doctrine--No First Use (NFU) and massive retaliation--the official doctrine remains unrevised. This builds further ambiguity and risk regarding misperception of nuclear intentions and capabilities into the regional security context.
Alongside its nuclear force and nuclear doctrine policies, Indian nonproliferation policy is a third component of its overall nuclear approach. Indian nonproliferation policy is probably in greater convergence with that of the United States today than at any point in recent history. As the authors argue, India is likely to remain a constructive force in international nonproliferation policy so long as it is not expected to terminate all relations with a state at the center of a proliferation dispute (i.e., Iran) for the sole purpose of resolving that issue.
These developments all have growing relevance for U.S. interests in the region. Washington and New Delhi are building an increasingly wide-ranging defense relationship, directed against rising Chinese regional aggression. However, this Letort Paper recommends that this relationship not preclude Washington from developing an awareness of the evolving nuclear regional security conditions, discussed previously, and how it may become involved, even if only diplomatically, in a future regional conflict featuring some of these dynamics.
About the Author: ABOUT THE AUTHORS:
YOGESH JOSHI is a Ph.D. candidate at the Center for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research focus is on Indian foreign and security policy and he has published in Survival, Comparative Strategy, U.S. Naval War College Review, Asia Policy, Harvard Asia Quarterly, and India Review. He has held visiting fellowships at George Washington University, King's College London, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His most recent work, The Imagined Arsenal: India's Nuclear Decision-Making, 1973-76, was published by the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. He holds a B.Sc. in physics from Delhi University and an M.A. and M.Phil. from
Jawaharlal Nehru University.
FRANK O'DONNELL is a lecturer in strategic studies at University of Plymouth at the Britannia Royal Naval College, and a fellow of the Dartmouth Centre for Seapower and Strategy. He conducts research on Indian and Asian security, and has recently published articles on Indian nuclear strategy and force development in Asian Survey, Comparative Strategy, Orbis, and
Survival journals. Dr. O'Donnell holds a Ph.D. in defence studies from King's College London, an M.Sc. in strategic studies from University of Aberdeen, and an M.A. in international relations and Middle East studies from University of St. Andrews.
HARSH V. PANT is a professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King's College London. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India policy studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. His current research is focused on Asian security issues. His
most recent books include: Handbook of India's Defence Policy (Routledge, 2016); India's Afghan Muddle (HarperCollins, 2014); The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process and Great Power Politics (Oxford University Press, 2011); and The Rise of China: Implications for India (Cambridge University Press, 2012). Dr. Pant is a graduate of Delhi University. He holds an M.A. and an M.Phil. from Jawaharlal Nehru University and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Notre Dame.
