With the March 2010 publication of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, the U.S. Army formally introduced Design into its doctrine. Design is defined in FM 5-0 as "a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them" (Headquarters; Department of the Army, 2010) p. 3-1). The intent of Design is to help Commanders respond more adeptly to interactively complex, dynamic, and novel situations. It emphasizes using collaborative discourse to develop a holistic understanding of a problem space so that the appropriate solution becomes apparent. Though many people contend that successful Commanders have always engaged in Design-type activity, the codification of Design in doctrine nonetheless represents a significant organizational change for the Army. Organizational change efforts are often met with resistance, and the intended benefits of the change may go unrealized. Introducing an innovation, even when it is arguably an improvement over current practice, does not assure successful adoption of the innovation. A host of challenges that are often unrelated to the technical merits of new ideas can undermine successful implementation. The goal of this research effort was to illuminate the issues associated with introducing Design into the U.S. Army. A primary focus of the project was to identify and document significant organizational barriers to integration and operational use of Design. The research team also developed recommendations for steps the Army can take to address the challenges and facilitate the assimilation of Design into operations. The research team conducted three main tasks to identify significant obstacles to incorporating Design into operations. The first task was a literature review, focusing on military publications, doctrine, Combined Arms Center (CAC) blog posts, literature from the field of cognitive psychology, and literature from the field of organizational change. The second task was to conduct interviews with a variety of subject-matter experts, including those who teach Design, those who have received formal education in Design, and those who have applied Design-type activities in the field. The third task consisted of analysis and synthesis of the data, and development of recommendations. Although aspects of these findings have been documented elsewhere, there are currently no sources that address a comprehensive collection of barriers to adopting Design in the Army, nor that offer strategies for facilitating integration. Thus, this report offers a comprehensive account of the range of challenges affecting institutionalization of Design in the Army, in addition to suggestions for mitigating them. Recommendations are organized around the following topics: promoting Design within the Army, accumulating an evidence base, educating/instructing Design, rewards and incentives, facilitating the link to practice, and future research. The authors believe that awareness of the barriers and attention to strategies for addressing them will enhance the likelihood of effectively infusing Design into the way the Army does business. The findings of this research can benefit a variety of stakeholders, including Army leaders who are communicating and educating forces on the concept of Design and its application, doctrine authors who will be evolving the concept of Design in future iterations of doctrine, and Commanders and planning staff who are implementing Design in military operations. The findings may also be useful for those seeking insight into future research needs.