On 12 September 2007, the Air University commander tasked the Air Force Research Institute to provide an "outside-the-beltway" look at what the United States Air Force (USAF) should be about in the future, specifically what the service should look like 10-15 years from now. This timeframe was far enough outside the Fiscal Year Defense Plan to avoid some current programmatic boundaries, but not so far out as to be immune to current trends. Additionally, constraining the "future" to 15 years limits the rather miraculous invention of extraordinary weapons found in some war games and other future studies-for example, rods from space-and similarly bounds the geo-political landscape. The goal of this study is to identify the enduring attributes of our nation's air, space, and cyberspace force in context of major transitions. The tasking construct identified that the study should avoid a focus on hardware and resourcing, and implied the focus should be on roles, missions, and functions "such as the transition from the Cold War to Long War-or whatever it is to be called-era." Finally, the tasking identified the study's target audience as the presidential transition teams, with a delivery date "prior to the next election." Strategy in the post-Cold War era remains fluid. Without a focus on a single foe, it is often complicated and debatable. This study attempts to neither reinvent the USAF nor protect the status quo at the expense of conventional wisdom. The intent is to understand the value of the service's contribution to national security and, where appropriate, offer considerations for change. This study is informed by an understanding of airpower history and a realization of current USAF systems and strategies. It is not meant to be all encompassing, but rather provides insight into the most pressing issues facing the USAF in the post-Cold War era. Binding the strategy together is a redefinition of Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power; not in a weapons systems-specific context, but rather as a framework through which the USAF serves the nation. An underlying assumption is that while major combat operations, also known as conventional campaigns, are the most dangerous to America's national interest, the conduct of irregular warfare (IW) is the most likely. Accordingly, beyond recasting Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power, the study focuses on how the USAF can contribute to winning the current fight, while simultaneously maintaining the technological superiority necessary for prevailing in the future fight. In relation to the current fight, this study discusses winning IW, air mobility, air-ground integration and the planning cycle, intelligence reform, the transformation of airpower thought-including integration of unmanned aerial systems, the Total Force, and air base disaster contingency planning. In maintaining USAF technological superiority, the study focuses on acquisition reform, nuclear surety and deterrence, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber modernization, space defense in depth, and operationally responsive space and cyberspace operations.