Environmental challenges, and the potential solutions to address them, have a direct effect on living standards, the organization of economies, major infrastructures, and modes of urbanization. Since the publication of path-breaking contributions on the governance of environmental resources in the early 1990s, many political initiatives have been taken, numerous governance experiments have been conducted, and a large multi-disciplinary field of research has opened up. This interdisciplinary book takes stock of the knowledge that has accumulated to date, and addresses new challenges in the provision of environmental goods. It focuses on three essential dimensions with respect to governance. First, it addresses the issue of designing governance solutions through analyzing systems of rules, and levels of organization, in the governance and management of environmental issues. Second, it draws renewed attention to the negotiation processes among stakeholders playing a crucial role in
reaching agreements over issues and solutions, and in choosing and implementing particular policy instruments. Finally, it shows that compliance depends on a combination of formal rules, enforced by recognized authorities, and informal obligations, such as social and individual norms.

The evolution of the research frontiers on environmental governance shows that more legitimate and informed processes of collective decision, and more subtle and effective ways of managing compliance, can contribute to more effective policy. However, this book also illustrates that more democratic and effective governance should rely on more direct and pluralistic forms of involvement of citizens and stakeholders in the collective decision making processes

About the Author:
Eric Brousseau is a member of Dauphine Research in Management (DRM) a Joint Research Center between the CNRS and Paris-Dauphine. He is the founder and the director of the European School for New-Institutional Economics (ESNIE), and Vice-President of the International Society for New-Institutional Economics (ISNIE). His research agenda focuses on the economics of governance, with three main applied fields: innovation and intellectual property, Internet and digital economics, and environment. He has published more than 80 papers in various academic journals and books, authored one book, and edited more than 15 books or journal issues. He has been involved in researches funded by the French Government, the European Commission, the US National Science Foundation, the UN, and the OECD.

Tom Dedeurwaerdere is a graduate in polytechnical sciences and philosophy, with a PhD in philosophy. He is in charge of the direction of the global public goods sub-network of the European REFGOV network (6th framework program) and the biodiversity sub-network of Belgian Interuniversity network IUAPVI on democratic governance. Recent publications include 'From bioprospection to reflexive governance' in Ecological Economics and a special issue on the Microbiological Commons in The International Social Science Journal (fall 2006, vol. 188).

Pierre-Andre Jouvet has been dean of the faculty of Economics, Management, Mathematics and Computer Science at the University of Paris Ouest-Nanterre, La Defense. He heads the Economics of Sustainable Development Masters (EDDEE) and the Environment and Territory Development Masters. Professor Jouvet is the Scientific Director of the Climate Economics Chair. He is an economist that specializes in environmental economics, particularly the economics of public and political regulation (taxes, pollution permits, and voluntary contributions). His research is theoretical and covers EU-ETS analysis, risk, the relation between environment and longevity, and economic growth.

Marc Willinger is Director of LAMETA. His background is on risk and decision analysis. His current research combines environmental economics and experimental economics, with a special focus on the design of policies and incentives schemes applied to social dilemmas (contributions to public goods and common pool resources dilemmas). Recent papers deal with taxation schemes, binding agreements, and contract design under asymmetric information.