As the US Army shifts from being a forward-deployed force to a continental United States (CONUS)-based force, it must concurrently develop new plans and methods for rapidly deploying large numbers of units to contingency areas outside CONUS. Historically, the US Army has often been challenged in trying to rapidly deploy large forces from CONUS to the theater of operations. One need only review the Army's deployments to Cuba in 1898, to France in 1917, to Saudi Arabia in 1990, or most recently to Afghanistan and Iraq since 11 September 2001 and the enormous complexities associated with such operations to see that the Army has not always met its, and the nation's, expectations. Dr. Stephen D. Coats's study of the Army's efforts to assemble a contingency force at San Francisco for deployment to the Philippines in 1898 is an example of how the Army got it mostly right. One could argue that 1898 was a much simpler time and that the complexity associated with deploying ground forces has grown dramatically since then, and that would be correct. However, the Army of 1898 was not professionally trained to deploy and fight wars overseas. Additionally, the force that assembled at San Francisco was not a professional army. It was largely a volunteer force led by a few Regular Army generals and managed by a handful of Regular Army staff officers, none of whom had any appreciable experience in deployment operations. Yet they succeeded. As in all facets of military art, there are timeless principles that, if applied correctly, will go a long way toward helping planners achieve success. A careful reading of Dr. Coats's work will illuminate many of those principles. Today, as the US military prepares units for conflicts abroad and deploys forces overseas, it is instructive to examine how the Army coped with similar challenges in the late 19th century. This study analyzes efforts during the Spanish-American War to mobilize expeditions in San Francisco for the Army's first major overseas deployment: destination, the Philippines. Not since the Mexican War, fought a half-century earlier, had the American military attempted to prepare a large force to move to a foreign land. No prewar plans existed to provide a blueprint for this endeavor in 1898. To compound deployment challenges on the West Coast, the Army had already moved most of its Regular organizations and logistics support to Southern assembly areas oriented on objectives in the Caribbean. President William McKinley assigned two general officers, Wesley Merritt and Elwell S. Otis, to quarter, organize, train, and equip designated forces in San Francisco, the port of embarkation. Drawing on available, but limited, logistics resources from military organizations in the area, Merritt's command received thousands of Regulars and Volunteers who poured into the Golden Gate region for duty overseas. Units initially camped on military reservations but eventually spilled over into several locations in the city. Given the paucity of medical and morale support available to the troops through the military, the San Francisco community rallied behind local relief societies and religious organizations on behalf of the expeditionary forces. Citizens donated money, food, goods, and services through the Red Cross, Young Men's Christian Association, and Catholic Truth Society. Each organization established shelters in the encampments to better assist those in uniform. This study finds that to mobilize effectively, the Army depended on fundamentals then that are still prized to this day: leadership, initiative, and resourcefulness. It also reveals the vital role that private volunteer organizations and the civilian community played in supporting the military forces assembling at the Golden Gate. Together the American Army and San Francisco community succeeded in sustaining and deploying expeditionary forces that fought the battle of Manila in August 1898.