A number of groups have advised NASA on various aspects of the ISS, particularly following the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Their reviews have been timely and their contributions significant. The International Space Station (ISS) Safety Task Force was established to review a broad range of Station vulnerabilities and consequences. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-155) required the establishment of an independent task force to discover and assess any vulnerabilities of the ISS that could lead to its destruction, compromise the health of its crew, or necessitate its premature abandonment. The legislation further identified particular positions within and external to NASA that would serve as mandatory task force members. Having received this legislative direction, the NASA administrator charted the ISS Independent Safety Task Force (IISTF) as an advisory body on February 28, 2006. The IISTF's approach to the assigned tasks was two dimensional. First, the Task Force identified vulnerabilities (hazards) that could cause ISS destruction, compromise crew health, or necessitate the premature abandonment of the ISS. The Task Force reviewed the controls against these vulnerabilities, which included design requirements, safety controls, and procedural/operational controls. Second, the Task Force reviewed the ISS Program's crosscutting management functions consisting of plans, procedures, governing processes, and management processes that should provide advanced indications and warnings that will avoid events that might lead to destruction of the ISS, loss of the crew, or abandonment of the Station as well as avoid crew health problems. The identified vulnerabilities and IISTF scope are aligned into the following categories in accordance with the charter: Loss of crew member and/or loss of Station, Premature abandonment of the Station, Crew health. The ISS Program provided presentations on each of these vulnerabilities as well as the crosscutting management functions. The Program also responded to a number of actions from the Task Force members. The ISS Program's crosscutting management functions are described in Section 3. Treatment of threats to and vulnerabilities of the ISS is described in Section 4. Observations and recommendations are in Section 5, and the Task Force's conclusions and a compilation of its recommendations are listed in Section 6. To address the various aspects of its assigned tasks, the IISTF reviewed a large volume of technical material and information provided by the ISS Program.