"In many works spanning more than forty years, Dejnozka has mined, explicated, and examined the ontology of the Analytic tradition. In this book he broadens his scope to consider the sorts of ontological distinction and identity as they were understood by such pre-Analytic philosophers as Suárez, Descartes, Duns Scotus, and Aristotle. He aims to show not only where these philosophers went wrong, or right, but also that, notwithstanding important differences between the Analytic and pre-Analytic positions on these topics, there is a still deeper agreement between them. To my knowledge, very few books have undertaken to show this. Dejnozka's arguments and insights are, as always, well worth sustained philosophical reflection. Highly recommended." -Stewart Umphrey. BOOK DESCRIPTION: This book brings the ontological distinctions out of the museum of antiquities and into philosophy today, changing them greatly in the process. Mental distinctions are abolished, and all ontological distinctions are assayed as formal distinctions in the sense of having a foundation in reality. The book includes three previously unpublished essays on the ontological distinctions in Francisco Suárez, René Descartes, and Bertrand Russell. The first two essays are primarily critical and original thinking. The third essay shows how the ontological distinctions apply in the philosophy of Russell. It summarizes and goes beyond my interpretation of Russell in The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins. ABSTRACT OF ESSAY 1: In "On Various Kinds of Distinctions" in Disputationes Metaphysicae, Francisco Suárez admits real distinction, modal distinction, and mental distinction, but rejects formal distinction. I accept real distinction and modal distinction. But I argue against mental distinction and in favor of formal distinction. I hold that his mental distinctions ought to be formal distinctions, and that his modal distinctions are actually a kind of formal distinction. He also needs to be updated. Much of the update is due to Frege, Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Descartes follows Suárez so closely that the critique of Suárez applies to Descartes as well. ABSTRACT OF ESSAY 2: I discuss three Aristotelian versions of Bertrand Russell's infinite regress of resemblances argument for the existence of universals. The property regress is basically the same as Russell's. The form regress replaces Russell's exactly similar properties with exactly similar forms, and the pros hen regress replaces them with exactly similar kinds of pros hen being. The result is that properties, forms, and kinds of pros hen being are all universals that are literally and numerically identical across their instances. Aristotle might well have disagreed, but then he did not see Russell's regress. The concepts of form and of pros hen relation are problematic, especially the concept of formal distinction, which has been notoriously difficult to explain for centuries. I explain it in terms of the modern concept of a truth-ground. The concept of pros hen being is problematic concerning its relation to univocal being and to analogical being. ABSTRACT OF ESSAY 3: This essay is about being qua identity theories in Bertrand Russell. A being qua identity theory is any theory that aims to define, explain, or understand some concept of being, reality, existence, or reference in terms of some concept of identity. Most philosophers know that Quine coined the slogan "no entity without identity," and that Wittgenstein understood reference in terms of identity criteria. Most also know that Russell was a primary influence on Wittgenstein and Quine on many logical and metaphysical issues. But it is not well known that Russell was also a "no entity without identity" theorist influencing Wittgenstein and Quine on the deepest ontological level. I explain all of Russell's main ontological phases as belonging to a kind of being qua identity theory which I call modified realism.