There are two main aims of this thesis: the first is to demonstrate that
there is an important version of empiricism - "methodological empiricism"
- which is a central part of the empiricist tradition but has been neglected in
current philosophy of science. The second aim is to develop methodological
empiricism in light of current science. The first aim is met by first articulating
what I take methodological empricism to mean, alongside articulating the
more dominant version of empiricism - "epistemic empiricism". I explicate
both via several characteristics for each, and then trace a history of both
positions from Ancient Western philosophy up until current times. Finally,
I give evidence of the neglect of methodological empiricism in current
philosophy of science. The second aim is met by, first, presenting four criteria
for a current version of methodological empiricism that are directly derived
from the characteristics of methodological empiricism through its history. I
then consider three topics within recent philosophy of science that prima facie
pose a challenge to methodological empiricism, all of which can be broadly
characterised as appearing to be non-empirical in some way - analogue
confirmation, philosophy of computer simulations, and non-empirical theory
confirmation. It is argued that, ultimately, analogue confirmation and
computer simulation are compatible with methodological empiricism, but
that non-empirical theory confirmation is not. I argue that this should gives
us good reason to reject non-empirical theory confirmation.
