The war between realism and conventionalism bitterly rages ever strong. We find early
skirmishes in Plato's Cratylus, in which Socrates examines and demonstrates the
problems with both of these views of language; and the contemporary realist-empiricist
debates in the philosophy of science carry on that same traditional feud. The feud in both
of these cases, and many historical links in between, is the same: do humankind's
concepts pick out the real furniture of the world, or not? This discussion is of course only
one facet of a broader dialogue that concerns the very relationship between mind and
world, and what I would like to do in this dissertation is call to our attention (and
challenge) a particular presupposition that underlies both realism and conventionalism, in
the hopes that we might make some headway in the debate between those two rivals, both
alike in dignity. Of course, to assume that I might settle the issue once and for all would
be a very bold move indeed, and so for those who fancy boldness, I invite you to take up
the charge that I will begin (or, as you will see, continue) in the following chapters. For
those who prefer more of a restrained approach, please consider these remarks not as
intending to settle the dilemma, but rather to offer a third option few give much attention
these days.
