This report consists of three chapters and a concluding section. The opening chapter is an account of Harun's journey as an al-Qa`ida operative as he presents himself; it is also a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of the manuscript in providing reliable information about al-Qa`ida's activities. The remaining parts of the report focus on two aspects that feature prominently in Harun's account of al-Qa`ida: the first pertains to al-Qa`ida's ideology and the second to its organizational structure.With respect to ideology, which is discussed in chapter two, the report explores Harun's insight into al-Qa`ida's worldview to show how its ideology is meant to be consumed by its members who were schooled in its training camps and are close to its senior leaders; how its pragmatic approach to religious interpretation and rejection of regionalism, ethnocentrism and sectarianism led to its strategic success of attracting recruits from different regions and theological persuasions and turning them into "jihadis without borders," as Harun describes himself and his fellow al-Qa`ida members; and why takfiris, those jihadis who are inflexible in their interpretation of religion and rush to declare fellow Muslims to be unbelievers, are a liability to al-Qa`ida and to jihadism broadly.Harun's contention that al-Qa`ida's ideology is pragmatic and inclusive of Sunni Muslims espousing different theological orientations is corroborated by documents believed to be internal to al-Qa`ida, which are available in the Harmony Program-a database consisting of declassified captured battlefield documents. These documents reveal that it is not religiosity that defines al-Qa`ida's ideology; rather it is militancy that is the central tenet of its worldview. It is no secret that al-Qa`ida's resources did not go into building mosques and religious centers, but into building military training camps, financially supporting its members and their families, and funding terrorist activities and operations.Understanding al-Qa`ida's ideology is instructive in the context of studying radicalization and the role of religion therein. Some studies of jihadism confuse religion with religiosity and go on to suggest a causal link between religiosity and militancy when militants invoke religion to justify their actions. There is of course a link between religion and religiosity, but it should not be forgotten that prior to the emergence of the nation-state, religions served as the language of politics and religiosity was not an essential criterion for rulers. A link may also exist between religiosity and militancy. However, studies of religious militants show that Islam does not have a monopoly on inspiring militancy, and studies of terrorism suggest that there is much more to the inner workings of terrorist groups than ideology.