The uprising against Bahrain's Al Khalifa royal family that began on February 14, 2011, has not achieved the goals of the mostly Shiite opposition to establish a constitutional monarchy but has defied government efforts to end the unrest. Demonstrations continue, although they have become smaller and less frequent over the past few years, as Bahrain's Shiites seek to pressure the Sunnidominated government to increase Shiite political influence and rights. The government has enacted those reforms that do not fundamentally dilute its authority, and has continued to prosecute and intimidate opposition leaders. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities have not been satisfied by modest reforms. And, since 2012, violent factions of oppositionists have emerged and become more organized, claiming responsibility for increasingly frequent bombings and other violent attacks primarily against security officials.The government and opposition have attempted to resolve the unrest through two "national dialogues" (July 2011 and February to December 2013), but neither reached a comprehensive solution. A November 2011 report by a government-appointed "Independent Commission of Inquiry" (BICI) criticized the government's actions against the unrest, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation of the 26 BICI recommendations has been modest. Still, both sides have left the door open to further dialogue and engagement, and the government appears to be trying to persuade mainstream opposition groups to compete in the next parliamentary elections to be held on November 22, 2014.The unrest in Bahrain has presented a policy dilemma for the Obama Administration because Bahrain is a pivotal ally. It has hosted the U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf since 1946. The United States has had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Bahrain since 1991 and has designated it a "major non-NATO ally." There are about 7,000 U.S. forces in Bahrain, mostly located at the naval headquarters site. Apparently to pressure the government to reduce its use of force against protesters, the Administration has held up some sales to Bahrain of arms that could be used for internal security purposes. The Administration has continued sales of equipment that are exclusively for external defense. Bahrain's opposition asserts that the United States is downplaying regime abuses in order to protect this extensive security relationship. A sign that the defense relationship has been unaffected by differences over Bahrain's handling of the unrest, in September 2014 Bahrain joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization by conducting air strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria.