From what I have seen in Afghanistan since 2001 the west is confused about war, trying to win hearts and minds and enforcing rules of engagement that make western troops in Afghanistan sitting ducks. As an American friend summed it up, we have lost that brutality necessary to win wars and are very confused. Our author attempts to rationalize and submit to logic a massive human endeavour known as military history.A gargantuan enterprise.He writes fluently and logically but as I read through the book, I could not agree with his logic.Rather I found his logic lopsided and at times unjustified and sweeping. Naturally I read every page of this massive 729 page book so that no injustice is committed in reviewing the book. From page-2 my impression was that our writer is a staunch pacifist who hates war: -- On page-6 the writer rightly identifies misperception as a major cause of failure in war: -- The writer delivers judgements with which I could not agree like on page -7 where he claims that the idea of decisive battles became fashionable from 1815: -- The battle has always been a fascinating topic from time immemorial and the writer does not prove how 1815 was a landmark ? Again on page-8 one may not agree with his logic: -- Some battles were foregone conclusions like Lees failure at Gettysburg keeping in mind the Union superiority in numbers and logistics was inevitable. Waterloo was again a foregone conclusion keeping in view the odds that Napoleon was facing . Military writers should avoid passing such sweeping judgements. The writer concentrates on land combat and ignores naval powers influence on outcome of battles. The writers claim about defence on page-10 is again fallacious: -- Defence was never the decisive form of warfare except in Russia where the outcome was decided by space logistics and mechanics.But not so in most other European battles. Why our writer had to make such a claim needs to be contested ? On page-12 he was nothing to say about role of naval power in Napoleons ultimate strategic defeat which remains a weak part of the narrative: -- He makes broad brushed like not taking into account the fact that Austro Hungarian army was no match for Moltkes army since Austro Hungarian Army was not a homogenous army and had severe issues of integration. Similarly he ignores the fact that superior doctrine and tactics played a major role in Franco Prussian war but by First World War due to radical advances in power of defensive weapons the offense as it existed in 1914 had become obsolete. As I read the book, I realized that the writer was trying to simplify many complicated issues and in the process delivering judgements that were not wholly or sometimes even partially accurate. What he wrote was good enough to convince the judges to give him a 50,000 USD prize, but not convincing for a military history enthusiast like this scribe ? On page-14 the writers conclusions are erroneous: -- In Crimea Russia lost and Britain achieved all its objectives and the attrition was not very high, apart from blunders like charge of light brigade. In US Civil war manoeuvre was alive and the north won because of overwhelming material superiority. As I read I cannot agree with the authors line of thought and reasoning as on page-15: --