The capacity, transparency, legitimacy, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial to Afghan stability as U.S.-led NATO forces exit Afghanistan by 2016. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001. But, the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among its major factions are ever present. Hamid Karzai, who served as president since late 2001, was constitutionally term-limited and left office when his successor, Ashraf Ghani, was inaugurated on September 29. The inauguration represented a resolution of an election dispute that consumed Afghan and U.S. official attention from April to September. The results of the April 5, 2014, first round of the election required a June 14 runoff between Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and Ghani. The runoff increased ethnic tensions between Pashtuns, Afghanistan's largest group represented by Ghani, and the second-largest group, the Tajiks, with whom Abdullah is identified. Amid accusations by Abdullah of a fraud-inspired large increase in turnout between the two rounds, preliminary results released July 7 showed Ghani ahead 56% to 44%. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Afghanistan twice to broker an agreement by the two candidates that tamped down threats by faction leaders loyal to Abdullah to seize power by force. The two contenders agreed to a recount of all 23,000 ballot boxes and to the formation of a post-election unity government under which the losing candidate will become "Chief Executive Officer" (CEO) of the government. The CEO is to function as a prime minister, pending a subsequent national deliberation over changing the constitution to create a formal prime ministerial post. On September 21, the two candidates formally signed the power-sharing agreement and Ghani was announced as election winner. Ghani was sworn in as president on September 29 and immediately appointed Abdullah as CEO. The resolution paved the way for the long-delayed signing of formal agreements to permit U.S. and NATO deployments to a post-2014 international mission to train Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism operations. Since taking office, Ghani has signaled he will make curbing governmental corruption and promoting women's rights key priorities. The election dispute was consequential because the constitution concentrates substantial power in the presidency. However, Ghani's authority will be constrained not only by the power-sharing arrangement with Abdullah as well as by an informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders. Faction leaders often maintain groups of armed fighters who often exercise arbitrary administration of justice and commit human rights abuses. International observers assert that there have been significant gains in civil society, women's rights, and media freedoms since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan-attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islamist influence and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented media programs. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women's groups, assert that many of these gains are at risk as international forces depart, especially should there be a reconciliation agreement between the government and insurgent leaders. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.